by Robert Hedrick, Aviation Law Group | August 23, 2026
As Aviation Law Group attorneys commence their investigation into the August 20, 2026 Security Aviation charter crash near Cape Newenham Airport, approximately 450 miles southwest of Anchorage, it became apparent that this is no ordinary airport, and that the approach and marginal weather conditions, all of which made landing on the runway very difficult, if not impossible, at the time of the accident.
The Cape Newenham Airport
The airport at Cape Newenham is not open to civilian aviation, and its use is limited to certified military air crews or authorized contract aircraft only. This is because the airstrip, constructed in 1951, serves only the Cape Newenham Long Range Radar Site, which is very remote and lightly populated. The airport is one of the most dangerous airports in the country due to its location on the side of a mountain, a steep runway grade, surrounding mountains, and ocean weather patterns.
The sole runway, 15/33, which essentially runs north/south, is on the side of a mountain. The runway is not level – it slopes 7.7 percent uphill to the south, such as when landing on runway 15. Only runway 15 is used for landing (uphill), and only runway 33 is used for takeoffs (downhill), due to the slope and immediate surrounding mountainous terrain. The airport is only approached from the north, over the Bering Sea.
The north end of runway 15 is approximately 2300 feet inland from the water, but is also 226 feet above the sea. It is 3945 feet long, 150 feet wide, and ascends from 226 feet above sea level on its north end to 531 feet above sea level on the south end, a difference of 305 feet.
In addition, the runway and its approach zone to the north have high mountainous terrain on both sides before, at, and after the runway, creating a bowl-like environment of elevated terrain surrounding the runway on all sides except to the south. As a result, the closer an aircraft flies on approach to the runway, the less likely it will have room to correct for errors, including performing a safe go-around, due to the surrounding terrain that rises in all directions except behind you.
Approach charts to the airport inform pilots of the danger.
CAUTION
1. Runway located on slope of 2306 foot mountain. High terrain both sides and South end of runway.
As a result, landings at the airport should only be performed in good visibility conditions and with proper approach angles and speeds, because at a certain point it may be impossible to go-around.
The approach end of runway 15.
Instrument Approaches at Cape Newenham
When clouds, fog, or haze prevent visual flight by reference to the ground below, pilots will fly in instrument conditions, that is, by reference to instruments and information in their cockpit and not by visual references outside.
Most airport runways have at least one published instrument approach procedure. Even though Cape Newenham Airport is not open to the public, there are two published instrument approaches for runway 15. These are both non-precision approaches, which means that there is no vertical navigation guidance to the runway, just horizontal. All approaches have minimum visibility requirements and minimum descent altitudes that aircraft cannot fly below unless the pilot can see the runway environment. In most cases, when there is weather reporting at an airport, the visibility must be at or greater than the minimum visibility for an instrument approach; otherwise, the approach should not be flown because of the likelihood that the runway environment will not be seen by the end of the approach and a go-around will be required.
The instrument approaches at Cape Newenham runway 15 are an RNAV GPS approach and an NDB DME approach.
The RNAV GPS Approach Chart For Cape Newenham
The NDB/DME Approach Chart for Cape Newenham
The Security Aviation Flight received an instrument flight plan for its flight to Cape Newenham Airport. While it is not known at this time which instrument approach the Security Aviation Cessna 441 was on, the approaches are similar in some respects, particularly regarding required visibility, minimum descent altitude, and the location of the missed approach point.
| Approach | Min Visibility | Min Descent Alt. | Missed App. Pt. |
| RNAV/GPS | 3 miles | 1320’ Above sea level | 2.2 mi from rwy |
| NDB/DME | 2.5 miles | 1240’ Above sea level | 2.1 mi from rwy |
14 CFR 135.225(c), which covers instrument landing minimums for Part 135 charter flights, provides:
No pilot may begin the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure to an airport unless the latest weather reported by the facility described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section indicates that weather conditions are at or above the authorized IFR landing minimums for that procedure
Thus, under Part 135, to commence one of the instrument approaches into Cape Newenham, the Security Aviation pilots would have needed a report of at least 2.5 to 3 miles of visibility at the airport. However, as reflected below, the National Weather Service did not report visibility at or above 1 mile for an hour before and an hour after the accident.
The Weather At Cape Newenham
The weather at Cape Newenham seriously deteriorated during the morning of August 20. Below are the National Weather Service weather observations for Cape Newenham covering the time frame before and after the accident, which occurred at approximately 11:45 am. Most notably is the constant fog and the vertical visibility of only 200 feet, which was measured approximately 10 minutes after the accident. That means the cloud ceiling was only 200 feet above the airport, which is approximately 730 feet above sea level. The aircraft, however, could not descend below 1240 or 1320 feet above sea level unless it had the airport environment in sight.
| Time | Wind | Vis | Weather | Sky Cond. | Temp | DP | RH | WC | Baro | Baro.Mb |
| 12:55 | W 14 | 0.25 | Patches Fog | BKN002 OVC013 | 48.9 | 48.7 | 99% | 44 | 30 | 1016.1 |
| 11:55 | NW 8 | 0.15 | Fog | VV002 | 49.5 | 49.3 | 99% | 47 | 30 | 1016.1 |
| 10:55 | W 6 | 0.75 | Fog/Mist | BKN003 | 48.9 | 48.7 | 99% | 47 | 29.99 | 1015.8 |
The National Weather Service information for Cape Newenham Airport shortly before, during, and after the accident.
It is not yet known what weather information the pilots received before the flight, or while en route or during approach. That information will be critical to the NTSB’s investigation because what the pilots knew and did not know shaped their decision-making leading up to the accident.
The Flight
Initial reports from the NTSB state that the Cessna 441 filed an instrument flight plan and received an instrument clearance to fly to Cape Newenham. The aircraft departed Anchorage International Airport at approximately 9:15 a.m., and crashed at approximately 12:15 p.m.
The pilots had made one approach to runway 15 and had to go around, likely due to lack of visibility; they could not see the runway while flying down to the minimum descent altitude on the approach. After going around at some point, it was decided that they would try a second approach. This approach ended up crashing in steep terrain just left of the runway 15 approach.
Early Analysis
Based on the information known to date, it does not appear that the reported visibility at Cape Newenham was sufficient for the approach. At least 2.5 to 3 miles of visibility was needed, and it appears the visibility may not have exceeded 1 mile. Moreover, the report of 200 feet vertical visibility around 20 minutes before the accident suggests that the pilots may not have seen the runway environment when flying the minimum descent altitude of 1240 or 1320 feet above sea level, because that would place the cloud ceiling much lower, at about 700 feet above sea level (200 feet above ground level) at the north end of runway 15. Unable to see the runway at the minimum descent altitude, the aircraft could not legally fly below that altitude, and was required to commence a go-around by the time they were 2.1 or 2.2 miles from the runway (at the missed approach point), which would give them sufficient distance from rising terrain to perform a go-around and avoid terrain that the pilots likely could not see.
Both published instrument approaches contain the following warning:
CAUTION [. . .]
2. Successful go-around improbable if initiated past the Missed Approach Point
Thus, once the pilots kept flying closer than two miles toward runway 15, at some point they went past a point of no return, because the aircraft was in a position where a second go-around became impossible due to the surrounding rising terrain. They either were going to find the runway and land, or crash-land off the airport. It was like flying up a steep and narrow box canyon with no way out, except one runway at the bottom. Add restricted visibility to rising terrain, and it’s a very dangerous situation for any pilot.
ALG’s initial investigation found inconsistencies with some information contained in the NDB/DME approach chart. For example, the runway 15 north end elevation appears to list 531 feet above sea level, when in fact it is approximately 226 feet. The terrain obstruction shown near there on the diagram is listed at 352 feet, which would be much less of a concern if the runway started at 531 feet, but it does not. Starting at 226 feet, the obstruction becomes a serious concern. Moreover, the instructions on the approach chart regarding the elevation of that terrain state it is at 235 feet above sea level, not 352 feet as indicated in the diagram. The diagram also places the obstruction a few hundred feet from the runway, but the instructions state it is 1611 feet left of course.
Aviation Law Group represents families of victims in aviation accidents throughout the US and worldwide. ALG has more than 35 years of handling aviation cases, including many cases in Alaska. ALG has 5 aviation attorneys, all of whom are commercial pilots, and two are mechanics. Two of our attorneys also have extensive experience flying Boeing and Airbus jets for the airlines. Attorney Robert Hedrick is also licensed in Alaska. ALG is currently involved in numerous accidents in Alaska, including cases against Bering Air and Maritime Helicopters.
Comments about this article or questions about representation can be addressed to info@aviationlawgroup.com or directly to Robert Hedrick (206) 251-5915